tionwide as they exited the polls. Among the questions asked in the national exit poll and in twenty individual state polls was whether they "frequently listen [ed] to political call-in shows on radio." Exit polls have several desirable qualities. Their large sample sizes permit more extensive subgroup analyses than most academic surveys, particularly in statewide races. Also, the immediacy of the survey to actual voting eliminates the "recall problem," in which respondents at some remove from election day inaccurately report their electoral behavior. Moreover, exit poll interviews are conducted immediately after the act of voting, when the salience of elements of the voter's decisional calculus such as candidate qualities and policy concerns are highest.13
The VNS poll results are supplemented by the 1992 American National Election Study (NES) conducted by the University of Michigan's Center for Political Studies, the 1993 Times Mirror survey, and data from Luntz Research Companies. Unless otherwise noted, the data presented in this essay are from VNS.
TALK RADIO AND THE 1994 ELECTIONS
Talk radio is thought to have wielded considerable political clout in the 1994 election, its influence pervading national, state, and local politics. Indeed, the 1994 election has been called the ""first talk-radio election."14 Talk Table 1 ). Similarly, Democrat Harris Wofford, who lost to challenger Rick Santorum 47 to 49 percent, would have been returned to the U.S. Senate from Pennsylvania by nonlisteners, who voted for him by a four point margin. The ballots cast by the one-fifth of the electorate who listened to talk radio, however, went decisively to Santorum.
The roller coaster governor's contest in the Empire State is particularly notable, since the outcome could have gone in either direction had talk listeners voted as nonlisteners had. According to VNS, the 81 percent of the New York electorate who did not listen to talk radio had divided their votes evenly between incumbent Democrat Mario Cuomo and Republican challenger George Pataki. But Cuomo lost overall, 45 to 49 percent as three-fifths of talk radio listeners voted for Pataki. '5 The distinctiveness of talk voters was evident in other key races in large states. In New Jersey, talk radio listeners cast 57 percent of their votes for Republican Garabed "Chuck" Haytaian-19 percentage points more than for twoterm Democratic Senator Frank Lautenberg. Lautenberg carried the nonlistener vote by 53 to 44 percent and won the race overall, 50 to 47 percent. And in the Senate race in Virginia, talk listeners also behaved differently from nonlisteners. Republican Oliver North was the clear favorite over incumbent Democrat Charles Robb among talk listeners -55 to 36 percent in a three-candidate race. But nonlisteners favored Robb over North by a nine point margin-large enough to keep Robb in the Senate.
Leaders or spokespersons of any group that strongly supports a winning candidate or party often claim (as many talk show hosts have done) that it was their followers' votes that were responsible for putting the candidate or party in office. If their group had voted differently, they argue, the election would have turned out differently. It is in the political interest of such persons to do so. Rewards ought to come, they say at least implicitly, from such loyalty.
This article does not claim that talk radio, and by extension, the talk vote determined the outcome of the 1994 elections generally or in any particular race. Rather, it maintains that talk voters appear to be an emerging political category worthy of empirical analyses comparable to the treatment political scientists have accorded other categories of citizens in the electorate -African Americans, Christian fundamentalists, union members, farmers, southerners, the poor, senior citizens, and so forth-who have historically evidenced distinct voting patterns. The gender differences among talk listeners (and, to a lesser extent, among nonlisteners) are in accord with the literature on the gender gap-the partisan division of the voting behavior of men and women-which emerged during the 1980 presidential election as women appeared to be moving to the Democratic party. The emphasis of commentators on women and their Democratic leanings obscured, however, a politically more profound movement-a reverse gender gap of white men voting increasingly Republican.16 These gender gaps held in the 1988 and 1992 presidential elections and the 1990 midterm elections. In 1994, the partisan rift between men and women was the widest ever since the Reagan-Carter election when the "gender gap" entered the political vocabulary.'7
The 1994 Republican electoral successes have been credited to the "angry white male."'8 Indeed, over three-fifths of white males surveyed by VNS voted But listening to talk radio appears to have been unrelated to the voting behavior of African Americans. Blacks, whether they listened to talk radio or not, voted Democratic by at least 8-to-1 margins. This should not be surprising given the monolithic black support for Democrats since 1964, despite the growing economic diversity among blacks, their conservatism on some sociocultural issues, and appeals of prominent leaders of the GOP to be more inclusionary. 19 Since talk radio was not associated with the partisan voting behavior of African Americans, the remainder of this article reports data on white talk radio listeners and nonlisteners unless otherwise specified.
Differences in talk radio listening patterns and voting behavior were not as pronounced among other demographic or socioeconomic groupings such as marital status, religious affiliation, education (except for a moderate curvilinear pattern peaking among those completing four years of college), and income (except for a moderate disparity between the poorest and wealthiest categories) than they were with gender. None of these factors'were nearly as important in differentiating the voting behavior of talk listeners from non-talk listeners as race in conjunction with gender. Note: 1. Percentages for columns 1, 3 and 4 may not add to 100% due to rounding, votes for minor party candidates, and "omits." Columns 2 and 5 do not add to 100% since they are subsets of the response category from which they are computed.
2. Column 2 should be read, for example, that 29% of conservatives listened to talk radio (and, thus, 71% did not); 26% of Republicans listened to talk radio (and, thus, 74% did not); 26% of Bush voters listened to talk radio (and, thus, 74% did not).
3. Column 5 is a product of columns 1 and 2. Thus, the 11 % of the electorate who were conservative talk radio listeners is the product of the 39% of the electorate who called themselves conservatives multiplied by the 29% of conservatives who listened to talk radio. Likewise, the 10% of the electorate who were Republican talk radio listeners is the product of the 39% of the electorate who called themselves Republican multiplied by the 26% who listened to talk radio.
Source: Voter News Service 1994 national House exit poll.
Politics and Talk Radio
What most distinguished talk listeners from nonlisteners was their ideology, partisanship, and the way those in the "political middle" voted in 1992 and 1994. (See Tables 2 and 3 .) Conservative commentator William Rusher's observation that talk radio had become a "conservative precinct" was correct.20 The data in Table 2 demonstrate this in several ways. First, self-described conservatives in the 1994 electorate were much more likely to have listened to talk radio than liberals-29 vs. 16 percent (column 2). This far greater tendency of conservatives to tune into talk radio, when combined with the fact that there were many more conservatives 20 Rusher, "The Importance of Talk Radio." in the total electorate than liberals -39 vs. 16 percent (column 1)-produced an electorate in which conservative talk radio listeners made up 11 percent of all 1994 House voters while talk radio-listening liberals made up only 2 percent (column 5). Simply, the profile of the 1994 national House electorate shows conservatives outnumbering liberals, and substantially more likely to have tuned into talk radio.
The conservative dominance of the talk radio medium is further illustrated by the ideological profile of the 1994 talk voter: 54 percent of 1994 white voters who tuned into talk radio were self-described conservatives, while only 12 percent characterized themselves as liberals -a better than 4 to 1 margin (column 3).
This decidedly conservative bent of the white talk radio audience in 1994 appears to offer little cheer for those who wish to present an effective counterbalance to conservative talk radio. The five to one edge of conservative to liberal talk listeners in the entire 1994 national electorate (column 5) suggests that liberal talk hosts such as Mario Cuomo, Jerry Brown, Gary Hart, and Jim Hightower face an uphill struggle to provide ideological balance to the medium.
More air time for talk radio programs hosted by liberals, it could be argued, might nonetheless lead more nonliberals as well as liberals to listen to liberal talk radio -"broadcast it and they will come." This appears problematic for a number of reasons. The available pool of white liberals in the 1994 white electorate was too small to provide an effective counterweight to conservative talk. Even if more progressive radio hosts could have quadrupled listenership among white liberals from 16 percent in 1994 to 64 percent, the liberal talk audience that would have been generated would still have not equalled the percentage of conser-vative talk listeners who voted in the 1994 elections (The figures are derived from columns 1 and 2 in Table 2 ).
Why would conservatives and moderates tune into liberal talk radio? Because as the Times-Mirror Vocal Minority survey found, most listeners tune in for information, for "surveillance," for listening to different viewpoints, for "reconnaissance." Why might they, along with liberals, not stay tuned? The Vocal Minority also found that entertainment was a major reason for listening to talk radio. While hardly a scientifically tested proposition, liberal hosts appear to have been unsuccessful in challenging the dominance of conservative talk, at least in part, because, according to commentators such as Hightower, they have been "dull and stuck up."21 Indeed, conservative talk radio may have increased its edge over its liberal counterpart in the year after the midterm elections. Hightower, the most widely listened to liberal talk show host, seems to have fallen victim to insufficient ratings. His show was dropped by ABC in October 1995. In January 1995, San Francisco's leading talk station replaced liberal talk show hosts with conservatives.22
Talk radio was also a Republican precinct for white talk radio listeners in 1994. A majority checked off Republican in VNS's party identification question; a fifth selected Democrat, while independents accounted for nearly three-in-ten talk voters. A majority of 1994 white talk voters reported having cast a ballot for George Bush in 1992; nonlisteners gave a plurality of their votes to Clinton.
A postelection nationwide survey by Luntz Research provides additional evidence of the political relevance of talk radio. It shows a strong monotonic relationship between the amount of talk radio listening and the tendency to vote Republican. Voters who had no exposure to talk radio evenly split their votes between Democratic and GOP candidates. Those who listened for at least eleven hours weekly supported Republican candidates by 3-to-1. Citizens who listened between one and ten hours a week tended to have voted more Republican, the more they listened to talk radio.23
The utility of the talk/nontalk dichotomy as an analytical category is illustrated by how differently white voters, particularly white talk voters, in the "middle" -self-described moderates, independents, and those who had voted for Perot in 1992-cast their ballots in 1994 compared to two years earlier. Generally, talk radio listeners evidenced the most pronounced shift toward Republicans. (See Table 3 In contrast to self-classified moderates and independents, Perot voters, both listeners and nonlisteners, were more alike in their voting behavior in 1994 than they were two years earlier. One explanation is that the labels "moderate" and "independent" are vague, meaning different things to different people. Both categories include individuals with disparate and often contradictory views. Perot voters are, by definition, more concretely defined as a group, having voted for a candidate who articulated a specific policy agenda, many items of which were coopted in 1994 by the GOP in their "Contract With America" (for example, term limits, a balanced budget amendment, and reform of House rules).
The Democratic rout in 1994 can be attributed, in part, to their failure to retain moderates, independents, and Perot voters -three skeptical and pivotal (especially in this era of dealignment) overlapping segments of the electorate.24
Talk Voter Issues VNS's 1994 exit poll asked respondents, "which one or two of these [issues] mattered most in your vote for Congress?" The nine issues were: foreign policy, health care, the federal budget deficit, Clinton's performance as president, crime, time for a change, candidate's experience, taxes, and the economy/jobs. Talk voters and nonlisteners differed substantially on the incidence of issue voting, the frequency and types of issues mentioned, and the salience of President Clinton's job performance in their vote decisions. White talk listeners were one-third less likely to cast an issueless vote than nonlisteners and substantially more likely to mention issues as reason for their vote (1.7 issues cited compared to .91). They were also twice as likely to say that Clinton's job performance factored into their vote decision. While there was no significant difference in the mean frequencies of issues mentioned by white talk voters who voted for either Republican or Democratic congressional candidates, those who voted for Democrats were more than twice as likely not to have found any of the issues included in VNS's exit poll as a factor in the vote.
Health care was by far the most important issue cited by nonlisteners. (See Table 4 .) Talk listeners were also concerned about health care; but taxes, crime, the state of the economy/jobs, as well as the Clinton presidency were important too.
There were significant differences in the salience of the types of the issues that "mattered most" to white talk voters depending on whether they supported Republicans or Democrats for the House (with the exception of crime and the deficit). Voters who went Democratic were two-and-a half times more concerned with health care and the experience of their congressional candidate, 10 points more inclined to cite the economy and jobs, and twice as likely to cast an issueless vote. To white talk voters who cast ballots for Republican House candidates, taxes, Clinton's job performance, and the need for change loomed large. These matters barely concerned their Democratic counterparts. Table 5 Table 6 .)
The Clinton factor is further seen in voters' responses to VNS's item, "which one or two issues mattered most" in their vote. Those white voters (talk listeners and nonlisteners) who cited localistic factors, such as the "experience" of the congressional candidate, chose Democrats, 56 to 44 percent. But whites who cited "Clinton's job performance" as among the top one or two reasons for their vote decision went for Republicans, 75 to 25 percent. Among white voters who listened to talk radio who cited the president's job performance as a key element in their vote, nearly nine of ten (88 to 12 percent) went for Republican House candidates. (The data above are derived from the indicators presented in Table  4 .) These data lend support to a view that has lost favor in recent years -that national factors, including the popularity of the incumbent president, the administration's performance, and the state of the economy can be at least as important as local factors (such as the qualities of the congressional candidates, incumbency, and so forth) in deciding off-year elections.26
Overall, the emergence of Clinton as an issue in the 1994 elections appears to have hurt Democratic House candidates. Listening to talk radio was related to heightened concern with Clinton and this, in turn, was coupled with significantly higher levels of support for Republican House candidates.
A Grievance Network?
Talk radio has been criticized as "catering to and built up by people who used to sit on bar stools and complain to each other"-a higher tech, albeit more impersonal grievance forum.27 While this characterization is unfair, the frustrations voiced over the airwaves did turn up in talk voters' evaluations of governmental institutions, political leaders, the direction of the nation, and in the reasons these citizens cited why they voted the way they did.
White talk voters, irrespective of partisanship and ideology, were more negative/oppositional than nonlistening voters as seen in Table 5 . Talk voters did not particularly like how Congress was handling its job, they were not happy with Clinton's job performance, nor did they like the direction that the president and Congress were taking the country. Overwhelming majorities of both talk voters and nontalk voters disapproved of Congress. Approval of Congress among white talk radio listeners was in single digits. Also, nearly five times as many white talk listeners-46 to 10 percent-voted in House elections to oppose President Clinton than to support him. Moreover, large majorities of both talk and nontalk voters felt that the country was "seriously off on the wrong track" rather than "generally moving in the right direction," with talk listeners more likely than those who didn't tune in to express this view (69 vs. 54 percent). Finally, talk listeners were twice as likely as nonlisteners to have cited "time for a change" as an issue that had figured prominently in their voting calculus. (See Table 4 .)
Other VNS data (not presented here) demonstrate conservatives were far more pessimistic than moderates and liberals; conservative talk radio listeners were the most pessimistic of all political groupings. Republican and independent talk voters were more likely to believe that the country was headed down the wrong track than their nonlistening counterparts. Talk voters who identified themselves as Democrats more widely believed than Republicans and independents that the country was going in the right direction, but still one-third were pessimistic about the future of the country. Citizens who thought the country was on the right track presumably would be more likely to vote for Democrats; those who saw the country headed down the wrong track would, if they voted retrospectively, presumably vote Republican. Both white talk and nontalk voters can be seen to have voted retrospectively in 1994 but there were again differences. (See Table 6 .) Talk listeners who evaluated the state of the nation positively gave House Democratic candidates 58 percent of their votes; nonlisteners holding this view were somewhat more supportive of Democrats. The relationship between believing that the country was heading down the wrong track and voting Republican was in the expected direction, but again it was much more pronounced among talk radio listeners. Two-thirds of such nonlisteners supported Republican House candidates; over four-fifths of talk listeners who thought the country was heading in the wrong direction voted Republican. Virtually the identical pattern turned up in the voting behavior of talk and nontalk listeners in Senate races.
That citizens dissatisfied with a Congress dominated by one party for roughly half a century would be inclined to vote against candidates of that party is not difficult to understand. Talk voters who disapproved of Congress supported Republicans 74 to 24 percent; they were 15 points more likely to support GOP candidates than nonlisteners dissatisfied with Congress. The opposite tendency among those who evaluated Congress positively is also easy to apprehend. Citi- The early studies of talk radio listeners as well as commentary by some journalists have portrayed talk radio listeners as socially isolated and politically alienated. The 1994 talk voter appears different from this portrayal: they were more opinionated, less apt to cast an issueless vote, and more concerned with public policy matters than with personal qualities of candidates.
These Voter News Service data are in accord with the 1992 NES data and the 1993 Times Mirror poll, which present a positive picture of talk voterswith their greater interest in politics and higher political participation rates. The 1992 National Election Study, for example, found talk voters to be substantially more likely to watch news every day, to be "very much" interested in and to pay a "great deal" of attention to news about campaigns, and to engage in political discussion. (See Table 7 .) Nonlisteners were significantly more likely to express no interest in campaigns, never to watch news programs, to pay no attention to the presidential campaign, and not to discuss politics with others. The greater political involvement of talk radio listeners is further suggested by a December 1995 survey conducted by the Washington Post, the Kennedy School of Government, and the Kaiser Family Foundation. The study found that regular listeners to Rush Limbaugh's radio talk show had much higher participation rates and information Senate, and gubernatorial exit poll data from VNS (as well as the 1993 Times Mirror and the 1992 National Election Study data) is that talk radio listeners are more conservative and Republican, more negative toward government, and more participatory than nonlisteners. The data paint a portrait of an opinionated, reasonably well educated, and socially integrated segment of the electorate.
The VNS data do not permit a causal analysis of the impact of talk radio; that is, the data cannot make the case that talk radio's effect on its listeners had a causal impact on their electoral behavior and led, at least in part, to the 1994 Republican congressional victories. Surely, many talk radio listeners would have both turned out on election day and cast their ballots the same way had they not tuned in to talk radio. But there were others who voted in 1994 the way they did because talk radio so amplified their interests and concerns that they turned out to vote where they would not have otherwise. And there were undoubtedly still other voters who were converted or persuaded in some way to change their vote because of their talk radio listening.
Journalistic observers and academic analysts offer widely divergent views of the effects of talk radio on American politics and its party system. Some believe that talk radio and other alternative media may exacerbate citizen disaffection toward government, political leaders, and the two major parties, aggravating electoral instability and societal strain. Thus, talk radio hosts and listeners pose a danger to American constitutional government-to the point of advocating insurrection. An Economist headline: "1-800-MOB-RULE" epitomizes this view.33 Other commentators see talk radio and new communications technologies as a plus for democracy by expanding the country's political conversation and discussion, and the citizen's sense of empowerment, considered by some theories the essence of democratic practice.34
The press talks of "cyberdemocracy," "electronic town halls," and computer-TV interactive voting. One fear is that these new media formats are ushering in an era of "hyperdemocracy" -an inherently unstable form of direct democracy. Talk radio thus presents a "specter of government by feverish plebiscite," a process that erodes the essence of "representative democracy" by making it "harder and harder for Congress to exercise considered judgment. "35 James Madison's warning of a phalanx of unbridled popular passions is raised in Time cover stories and on the editorial and op-ed pages of major American newspapers and in journals of opinion.
The classic American statement on the need for representative government has been Madison's "filtering"" imagery in the Federalist Papers: "to refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens" whose wisdom, prudence, and temperance would mitigate the popular excesses of democracy. The Framers of the Constitution, fearing impassioned majorities and their tendency to destroy and tyrannize, rejected plebiscitary or "pure" or "direct" democracy. "Representative democracy" was a defense against the "temporary errors and delusions" of the people.36
Madison's chief bulwark for the mischief of faction -the extended republicis now easily breached in an age of global, instantaneous communication in its many emerging forms. The advantage of a large country in 1787, as Madison argued in The Federalist, No. 10 was the check it placed on faction. When people are geographically dispersed, even if a majority has a "common motive," the distance among them will make it hard for them "to discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other."37 In Madison's view, the majority having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression.
Talk radio can create instantaneous communities of coexistent interest and passion over continental distances. And the filters -the chosen body of representatives -can be clogged with the telephone calls, faxes, and e-mail messages of an increasingly active citizenry and can be all too willing to act impulsively on behalf of these impassioned, fractious segments of the populace.
The growing prominence of talk radio and the emergence of new communications media over the last twenty years may have exacerbated the extended period of dealignment that has come to characterize American electoral politics. Talk radio allows voters to bypass both political parties and the established news media for political information and voting cues, thus further weakening the two-party system and destabilizing the political process.
Those who consider talk radio to have a salutary effect on American politics and government see the medium as a "forum for discussion and dissent" -the modern equivalent of the soapbox, committees of correspondence, the bully pulpit, the village square, and the town hall.38 Talk radio, for other defenders, is a mediating institution that gives people a sense of connection in politics, "fulfilling some of the functions that traditional political institutions-parties, unions, or civic groups used to perform."39 This and the other "new media" provide novel ways for officials and constituents to engage in two-way conversations; they are a modern means by which citizens can petition and instruct their elected representatives. Talk radio and TV shows "inasmuch as they improve both substance and relevance of information can contribute to democracy via a clearer picture of electoral alternatives," for the level of information helps determine how well the public can control government.40
Among other cited benefits of talk radio is that the medium diminishes political and social alienation and increases self-efflcacy and participation by creating a While talk radio is not direct democracy in the classic sense, or even the teledemocracy of participatory visionaries, it is an expression of a vox populia street-level public opinion -which must be factored into the American representative system. Today, representative institutions have entered an era in which their responsiveness to the popular will can be monitored not only by professional government watchers (journalists, social scientists) but also a growing attentive and suspicious public who need only a radio, telephone, and perhaps access to a computer or fax machine to become informed and communicate their views.
If democratic ideology is about "opposition as it is about governance," then the new communications technologies and new uses for older technologies such as talk radio can "provide citizens with alternative perspectives and force the critical exposure and scrutiny of elites." The effect can be to render elite control more tenuous and "undermine existing constellations of power."47
Talk radio is one of many forms of interactive telecommunications that have begun to comprise what Lawrence Grossman has dubbed the "electronic republic." These media appear to be transforming American democracy into a more participatory regime. The recent study and commentary on participatory democracy combined with the research reported here suggest a more plausible scenario: the American political system will need to accommodate an active and opinionated citizenry who can be mobilized by interactive communications and who can instantaneously transmit their views directly (and often in concert) to decision makers. The electorate in the electronic republic might come to resemble talk radio listeners as they have thus appeared-informed, although perhaps too partially; opinionated, but perhaps too passionately; and politically active, but perhaps too impetuously. But whether the talk radio phenomenon factionalizes or unifies, skews politics to the left, right, or center, whether its audiences are engaged citizens or divisive malcontents -talk radio listeners may signal the emergence of a new political type. *
